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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ] 
vs. 
DAYTON J- ("Rocky") BELGARD, ' 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 900267-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and commitment after a 
conviction for a third-degree felony. Jurisdiction of this Court 
is therefore conferred by 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
POINT I: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING 
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, TO WIT, A HAND 
GUN WHICH WAS SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF 
DEFENDANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AND IN CONTRO-
VENTION OF THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT AS 
DELINEATED IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The determinative constitutional provisions are as 
follows: 
1. Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
2. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall be issued, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Appellant was convicted of the 
crime of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, 
a felony of the third degree, and sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison for the indeterminate term of from 0 to 5 years. The 
proceedings occurred in the Third Judicial District in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, 
Judge presiding. 
B. Course of Proceedings. Defendant-Appellant, Dayton J. 
("Rocky") Belgard was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person, a felony of the third degree. After a 
bench trial with the Honorable Raymond S. Uno presiding, wherein 
the defendant was convicted as charged, the defendant-appellant 
filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment and For Suppression of Evidence, 
which raised a question regarding the constitutionality of certain 
evidence that was seized from the defendant at his hotel room and 
used against him at his trial. The trial court scheduled an 
evidentiary hearing on that issue and received testimony from 
Officer Bruce Maxwell and others regarding the search and seizure 
issue. 
After briefing and argument, the Court denied defendant's 
Motion for Arrest of Judgment and For Suppression of Evidence, and 
from that Order defendant-appellant appealed. 
C. Disposition at trial court. A judgment and commitment 
in the case was entered by the Court on or about May 2, 1990, 
judging the defendant guilty of the current charge and committing 
him to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of from 0-
5 years. 
D. Relevant facts. On March 3, 1989, Officer Bruce 
Maxwell, of the Salt Lake City Police Department, was dispatched 
to 1530 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, in connection with 
an auto theft investigation at Jensen Motors. (Tr. hearing, 
February 21, 1990, p. 4) Officer Maxwell learned from the 
complainant that on March 2, 1989, in the evening hours, two people 
had been in looking at a used car, and that those two people were 
interested in trading a hand gun and a VCR for this automobile. 
The two people involved were one male and one female. (Tr. 
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hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 5) Officer Maxwell further learned 
from the complainant that after the two individuals had left, the 
keys to the automobile they had been looking at were missing. (Tr. 
hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 7) 
The complainant further told Officer Maxwell that at some 
time during the evening hours of March 2 and the early morning 
hours of March 3, that the car the two people had been looking at 
was stolen. The particular car was distinctive in that it had a 
cracked windshield and distinctive stripes. (Tr. hearing, February 
21, 1990, p. 7.) 
Officer Maxwell learned that on the morning of March 3, 
1990, the complainant had seen the vehicle pull into a motel 
directly across the street from the dealership. The car was 
occupied at that time by a male and female. (Tr. hearing, February 
21, 1990, p. 7) 
Armed with that information, Officer Maxwell took the 
complainant with him in his police car and drove to the motel where 
the car had been spotted. At the motel, he observed that there was 
only one entrance to the motel which was used as both an exit and 
an entrance to the motel area; that each particular motel unit had 
assigned to it a carport. (Tr. hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 7) 
Officer Maxwell and the complainant observed the automobile which 
was stolen parked at the carport to Unit No. 4, and further 
observed that Unit No. 4 was occupied. The complainant positively 
identified that car as the stolen vehicle. (Tr. hearing, February 
21, 1990, p. 8) 
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Officer Maxwell, keeping the entrance to Unit No. 4, as 
well as the carport area, under constant surveillance, and further 
observing that there was no back entrance or exit to Unit No. 4, 
requested two other officers as backup. When the other officers 
arrived, Officer Maxwell sent one of the officers around to the 
back to observe the back window of Unit No. 4, and he and the other 
officer approached the front, or the door to Unit No. 4. (Tr. 
hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 9) Officer Maxwell knocked on the 
door to Unit No. 4. The defendant opened the door half way, 
attired in his undershorts. Officer Maxwell immediately stepped 
in and observed a weapon on the bed and hand-cuffed defendant-
appellant. (Tr. hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 15) 
Officer Maxwell testified at the Suppression Hearing that 
he was aware of and had in the past availed himself of the 
procedures to obtain telephonic warrants, but in this case, elected 
not to avail himself of those procedures before entering the motel 
room. (Tr. hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 19) He further 
testified that the time period from the time the motel room first 
went under surveillance until the officers entered the motel room 
was approximately 15 minutes, and that during that period of time, 
the room and the car had been under constant surveillance by the 
police officers. (Tr. hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 20) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The officer was obligated, after having developed 
sufficient probable cause to make an arrest, to secure either an 
arrest warrant telephonically, or otherwise, before entering the 
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motel room to effect the arrest. His failure to obtain any type 
of arrest warrant violates the defendant's rights as delineated 
under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution, and the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that 
evidence should not have been used to convict the defendant of the 
crime charged. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AN 
ARREST WARRANT IS REQUIRED BEFORE 
ENTRY INTO A RESIDENCE TO EFFECT A 
ROUTINE FELONY ARREST. FAILURE TO 
ACQUIRE THAT WARRANT BEFORE ENTRY 
REQUIRES THE SUPPRESSION OF THE 
EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF THE 
ILLEGAL ENTRY.. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Payton v. New York. 
445 U.S. 573 (1980) held that absent consent or exigent 
circumstances, an arrest warrant is required before a suspect can 
be arrested in his home. The Supreme Court acknowledged in Payton 
that a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law is that a warrant 
is required before the entry of the home is made to effect an 
arrest. 
Lower courts have continued to address the ramifications 
of the Payton decision, and have concluded that the meaning of 
"home" which was left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Payton, 
extends to motel rooms. The Indiana Court of Appeals in Mowrer v. 
State, 447 N.E.2d 1129 (Ind.App. 1983) held that a prior warrant 
should have been obtained before officers entered a hotel room to 
arrest the defendant. The defendant's use of his room to engage 
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in illegal narcotics transaction did not, in the Court's opinion, 
diminish its status as its "home" for purposes of applying the 
warrant requirement. Similarly, guests who establish to the 
Court's satisfaction that they were more than mere transients, 
were held by the 11th Circuit in U.S. v. Torres, 705 F.2d 1287 
(11th Cir. 1983) to be covered by Payton's prior warrant 
requirement. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also concluded in 
U.S. v. Curaon. 700 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1983) that one of the 
factors to be considered in determining whether exigent 
circumstances exist was the time required to obtain a telephonic 
search warrant. Recognizing that the requirement of the warrant 
to enter a person's home is almost absolute, regardless of the 
abundance of probable cause that may otherwise justify the 
intrusion. As the Payton court stated: 
It is a "basic principle of Fourth Amendment 
law that searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." 
In fact, this Court, in State v. Northrup. 756 P. 2d 1228 
(Utah Ct.App. 1988) has recognized the viability and necessity of 
the Payton rationale in connection with a warrantless search of an 
individual's home based upon sufficient probable cause in holding: 
First we examine whether the police officer's 
entry into the home prior to the arrival of the 
search warrant violated Northrup's rights under the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
"Physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment 
is directed." [citations omitted] The warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, which is 
imposed on agents of the government who seek to 
enter a home for purposes of search or arrest, is 
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the "principal protection against unnecessary 
intrusions into private dwellings." Thus, the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized as a 
basic principle, that "searches and seizures inside 
a home without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable." Payton v. U.S., 445 U.S. 573, 586 
(1980). 
It cannot be seriously contended that the officer lacked 
probable cause to secure a warrant. He had specifically located 
a car which the owner identified as a stolen car. He had that car 
under constant surveillance from the time he was initially 
dispatched to the motel until after the appellant's arrest. 
Additionally, the car was specifically located in the carport 
assigned to a specific motel room in the motel complex. There was 
probable cause to believe that the male and female who drove the 
automobile from the place in which it was stolen to the motel, were 
the same two individuals who had attempted to purchase the 
automobile the day before. The officer was obligated to attempt 
to secure an arrest warrant and/or a search warrant for the motel 
prior to entering the motel. No amount of probable cause dispenses 
with the requirement under Payton to obtain a warrant before the 
entry. 
POINT II: ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT A WARRANT 
BE OBTAINED BEFORE ENTRY INTO A HOME 
TO EFFECT AN ARREST. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 
(Utah 1990) developed a State constitutional analysis of Article 
I, Section 14 in holding as follows: 
The time has come for this court in applying 
an automobile exception to the warrant requirement 
of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, 
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to try to simplify, if possible, the search and 
seizure rules so that they can be more fairly 
followed by the police and the courts, and, at the 
same time, provide the public with consistent and 
predictable protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. This can be accomplished 
by eliminating some of the confusing exceptions to 
the warrant requirements that have been developed 
by federal law in recent years. See id. 
Specifically, this court will continue to use the 
concept of expectation of privacy as a suitable 
threshold criterion for determining whether Article 
I, Section 14 is applicable. Then if Article I. 
Section 14 appliesP warrantless searches will be 
permitted only where they satisfy their traditional 
justification, namely, to protect the safety of 
police or the public or to prevent the destruction 
of evidence. . . . 
Historically, this court, in applying Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution to 
warrantless vehicle searches, has required both 
probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
[Emphasis Added] 
The Larocco Opinion, albeit concerning itself with searches 
of automobiles, has general application to the state constitutional 
analysis of Article I, Section 14. In Larocco. the Utah Supreme 
Court, in determining under which general theory Article I, Section 
14 should be interpreted, that of general reasonableness or the 
warrant requirement, came down on the side of the warrant 
requirement. Constitutional analysis in the federal system has 
generally taken a confusing path. Larocco is significant in terms 
of Utah constitutional law. The Utah Supreme Court determined that 
warrantless searches will be permitted only where they satisfy 
their traditional justification, namely, to protect the safety of 
police or the public, or to prevent the destruction of evidence. 
In the case at bar, under the Larocco analysis, the State 
bears the burden of establishing either the existence of exigent 
circumstances, namely the destruction of evidence, or the need to 
act to protect either the public or the police in order to dispense 
with the warrant requirement of Article I, Section 14. 
In this case, the State could not prove that either of 
those exceptions were applicable. It could not be seriously 
contended that the evidence which the police sought would be 
destroyed since they had it in constant view. It could likewise 
not be seriously contended that the safety of police or public was 
involved, since the motel room had been under total police 
surveillance since their arrival and there was no back entrance. 
There was no indication that the occupants of the motel were in any 
way endangering anyone. The telephonic warrant requirements under 
77-23-4(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, do not require 
the existence of any exigent circumstances or safety concerns for 
the authorization of a telephonic warrant. See State v. Lopez, 676 
P.2d 393, 396 (Utah 1984). 
The conclusion is inescapable that under Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution and the Larocco analysis, the entry 
into Mr. Belgard's motel room was unconstitutional and the evidence 
obtained as the result of that unconstitutional entry should be 
suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the entry into Mr. Belgard's motel room violated 
both the Federal constitutional provisions of the Fourth Amendment 
and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution, the 
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evidence used to convict him should have been suppressed, and the 
appellant seeks of this Court a reversal of his conviction, 
DATED this day of September, 1990. 
BROWN & COX 
By: 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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I hereby certify that on the day of September, 1990, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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